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ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 
Arvid Båve 
 
NOTE: this is a pre-review version of the paper (in accordance with the copyright 
agreement), and thus differs substantially from the final version that will appear in print.  
 
Introduction 
I will here present an argument against the act-type theory of propositions, the view that 
propositions are act types directed toward propositional constituents. This theory has a 
venerable history, but has also gained much attention in recent years.1 Russellian variants of 
this theory typically identify the proposition that Socrates is wise with the act type of 
predicating the property of wisdom of Socrates. On a Fregean variant, it would rather be 
some act type directed toward the senses of “wise” and “Socrates”, e.g., the act type of 
saturating the former sense with the latter.  
 Before outlining the argument, let me, by way of a very brief introduction to the act-type 
theory, mention three important points about it. Firstly, the way in which we are supposed to 
get a hold of this act type of predicating, according to contemporary advocates, is by 
identifying them with more familiar act types (entertaining, according to Soames (2010, 
2015), and judging, according to Hanks (2011)). The question which of these alternatives is 
better has already generated a significant literature, but it will not concern us here, since my 																																																								
1 Notable among historical forerunners are Husserl, Meinong, and Reinach (see Moltmann 
and Textor (forthcoming) for a historical overview). The main contemporary texts include 
Hanks (2011, 2015), Soames (2010, 2015), and King et al. (2013). Related views are 
discussed in Jubien (2001) and Davis (2003). 
Acts and Alternative Analyses	
2 	
argument does not in any way involve the idea that predication or saturation should be 
identified with some other act type.  
Secondly, there is an intuitive objection against the act-type theory, which many take to 
show it to be a plain non-starter, and which I therefore had better mention here at the outset, 
if only to have it out of our way. The objection is that the theory is a “category mistake”, 
since “one cannot believe an act type”, “act types cannot be true or false”, etc. Schnieder 
(2006) and Soames (2015: 25ff.) have responded at length to this objection, decisively in my 
view, so I will here be content to defer to these works.  
Thirdly and finally, the more general spirit and point of the act-type theory is well 
illustrated by listing its main alleged advantages, which include its ability to 
 
(1) solve the problem of the unity of the proposition,  
(2) explain how propositions can be inherently representational and have their truth-
conditions essentially,  
(3) provide an attractive model of structured propositions,  
(4)  avoid Benacerraf problems of arbitrary identifications,  
(5)  explain how we can have cognitive access to propositions, and (yet) 
(6)  meet the Fregean demand of making propositions abstract, eternal and mind-
independent (in the sense that they can exist without any minds existing).  
 
While some aspects of the act-type theory have been explored in detail, particularly those 
connected with the points listed above, the question of how to develop an act-type-theoretical 
compositional semantics has mostly been ignored. This paper argues that once such 
considerations are brought into play, a serious problem arises.  
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The problem arises because many sentences have alternative analyses (see Dummett 
(1981: Chs. 15-16) for an authoritative introduction and discussion). For instance, “Mary 
loves John” can be seen as the result of saturating “ξ loves John” with “Mary” but also of 
saturating “Mary loves ξ” with “John”. (Note that “saturate” is here used in a sense related to 
linguistic expressions, distinct from the sense intended above, related to senses.) On the most 
obvious semantics to accompany a Russellian act-type theory, the sentence therefore comes 
out as expressing both  
 




the act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John.  
 
But since these act types are directed toward distinct entities, they are themselves distinct. Or 
so I will argue. Standard act-type theories are thus committed to the radical claim that this 
sentence is ambiguous (as we will see in §3, the argument easily generalizes to any atomic 
sentence with a polyadic predicate). As I explain further below, however, act-type theorists 
could avoid this conclusion by positing an additional basic act type, say, predicating*. The 
final argument will therefore take the form of a dilemma, one horn of which concerns 
standard act-type theories, and the other concerning such “pluralist” act-type theories. 
§1 defends the premise that certain sentences, and the propositions they express, must be 
taken as having alternative analyses. §2 contains a general discussion about act-types and 
their linguistic designators, where I defend two principles stating identity conditions on act 
types that play an important role in the argument. §3 lays out the main argument in full, and 
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§4 presents a further argument against the pluralist. §5 discusses whether the argument 
generalizes to structured propositions generally, but concludes that it only sets a certain 
constraint on theories of structured propositions. It is shown that Jeffrey King’s theory fails to 
meet the constraint, and is thus refuted. In §6, finally, I consider three retreat positions act-
type theorists might consider in view of my argument. 
 
1. Alternative analyses of sentences and propositions 
In this section, we will see some reasons for taking certain sentences and propositions to have 
alternative analyses (for a similar-minded discussion, see King (2007: 16ff.)). In preparation 
for this, we need some special terminology. I will enclose expressions within square brackets, 
“[ ]” to refer to the semantic correlate of the expression within. On the Russellian conception 
of propositions, [love] will be the loving relation, whereas on the Fregean conception it will 
be the sense of “love”. Although “semantic correlate” may on the Russellian conception seem 
to be the same as “semantic value”, the latter term would not be neutral with respect to the 
Russellian-Fregean divide. For on Fregean act-type theories, we want a term covering the 
sense of a name, but the “semantic value” of a name is rather ubiquitously taken to be its 
referent. Better, then, to use the neutral term “correlate”. 
I will also say that every expression expresses its semantic correlate, staying neutral on the 
nature of this expressing relation. On the Russellian conception, the word “express” is 
misleading for the case of proper names, since we don’t normally say that names express 
their referents. As long as we take notice of this terminological oddity, however, it should 
cause no confusion. I will throughout stick to this neutral notation with square brackets, 
“semantic correlate”, and “express”. Since the argument is wholly formulated in these neutral 
terms, it targets at once Fregean and Russellian act-type theories.  
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Finally, I will distinguish between simple predicates like “ξ runs” or “ξ = ζ”, and complex 
ones, like “ξ = 3” (when saying that “ξ runs” is simple, I ignore tense and mood). The 
complex predicate, “ξ = 3”, results from saturating (in the linguistic sense) “ξ = ζ” in its 
second place by “3”. 
Now, there are two main kinds of resistance against the idea of alternative analyses. On 
the one hand, one might think, with Frank Ramsey, that the very idea of alternative analyses 
is incoherent (1929: 118). I side with Geach (1975) and Dummett (1981: Chs. 15-16, 
especially pp. 264ff.), however, in holding his attitude to be ungrounded, and I do not think 
act-type theorists will want to defend their theory by appeal to Ramsey’s claim, especially 
given the strong reasons for thinking that we need to accept the phenomenon of alternative 
analyses. What exactly are these reasons? Why couldn’t act-type theorists just insist that 
“Mary loves John” only has one analysis, on which it is formed by the primitive expressions 
“Mary”, “ξ loves ζ”, and “John”?  
The answer comes in two parts, the first being the claim that we have to acknowledge 
complex predicates, and the second being the claim that once we do, the phenomenon of 
alternative analyses is inescapable. The second part is obvious. For if there is such a predicate 
as “ξ loves John”, we surely have to accept that it can be saturated with “Mary” to yield 
“Mary loves John”, and similarly for “Mary loves ξ” and “John”. And this is just what it is 
for the sentence to have alternative analyses. 
The reason we need to posit complex predicates is less obvious. I think we need complex 
predicates for many different purposes in semantics and logic, but I will focus on an 
argument due to Dummett, to the effect that we need them to state certain generalizations 
about inferences (1981: Chs. 15-16, especially pp. 273ff.). He even argued for positing such 
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unobvious predicates as the monadic predicate, “ξ killed ξ”, but we will only be concerned 
with the less exotic examples of  “Mary loves ξ” and “ξ loves John”.  
Here is a simple version of Dummett’s argument. Take the commonplace claim that the 
law of substitution of identicals is truth-preserving. We could state this claim thus: 
 
(SI) For any sentences of the forms “a = b”, “F(a)”, and “F(b)”, if the first two are true, 
so is the third. 
 
Here, a sentence of the form “F(a)” is of course a sentence formed by saturating a monadic 
predicate with a name. But unless we posit complex monadic predicates, like “ξ loves John”, 
(SI) will not even cover such an obvious instance of (SI) as, 
 
 (SII) If “John = James” and “John loves Mary” are true, so is “James loves Mary”. 
 
This establishes that “Mary loves John” and many other sentences have alternative analyses.  
Assuming propositions are structured and that there are complex predicates, we can also 
show there are alternative analyses of propositions (act-type theorists of course accept the 
first assumption, and the second one was established above). Given these assumptions, a 
sentence “F(a)” must be taken to express a proposition composed of the semantic correlates 
of “F(ξ)” and “a”, i.e., [F(ξ)] and [a]. Let us refer to this proposition as f([F(ξ)],[a]). But for 
a sentence like “Mary loves John”, there are two choices for the respective  “F(ξ)” and “a” 
here. Thus, [Mary loves John], the semantic correlate of “Mary loves John”, must be identical 
to both f([Mary loves ξ], [John]) and f([ξ loves John], [Mary]). And what it means for a 
proposition p to have alternative analyses is precisely that, for this function f taking 
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propositional constituents to propositions, p is identical with both f(x, y) and f(z, w), for 
distinct constituents x, y, z, w. 
The idea of alternative analyses of propositions is not new. Frege writes, 
 
If several proper names occur in a sentence, the corresponding thought can be 
analyzed into a complete and unsaturated part in different ways. The sense of each 
of these proper names can be set up as the complete part over against the rest of 
the thought as the unsaturated part (1884/1979: 295).  
 
Alternative analyses of propositions can also be established by an argument similar to the one 
involving (SI) above. To see this, consider how we might formulate a propositional analogue 
of (SI)? We could do so by saying that for any triple of propositions expressed by sentences 
of the form “a = b”, “F(a)”, and “F(b)”, if the first two are true, so is the third. But it would 
be odd and unsatisfactory if there were not also a direct formulation, which avoids this detour 
via sentences.  
The obvious idea is to say, 
 
(PI) For every x, y, P, if f2([=], x, y) and f(P, x) are true, then f(P, y) is true. 
 
Here, as before, f takes the semantic correlates of a monadic predicate and of a name to a 
proposition composed by the two, and f2 takes the semantic correlates of one dyadic predicate 
and two names to a proposition composed of them. The variables “x” and “y” in (PI) range 
over propositional constituents related to proper names (objects or name-senses), and “P” 
ranges over predicative, monadic propositional constituents (properties or monadic, 
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predicative senses). But unless “P” ranges over both simple and complex predicative 
propositional constituents, (PI) will fail to entail,  
 
(PII) If f2([=], [John], [James]) and f([Mary loves ξ], [John]) are true,  
then f([Mary loves ξ], [James]) is true.  
 
So, we must posit complex predicative propositional constituents, and that leads inescapably 
to alternative analyses of propositions.   
 Objection: “Mary loves John” only has one analysis, on which its structure is NP-VP. 
Reply: This may be true in some sense, but clearly, we still need to posit “Mary loves ξ” in 
order for the kinds of generalizations above to be of adequate generality. Besides, it would 
seem to be bad enough for the act-type theorist if the relevant sentences of first-order logic 
come out as ambiguous, however things stand with natural languages.  
 
2. Act types and their designators 
The argument of this paper will rely heavily on certain “structural” principles about act types, 
which I’ll introduce and defend in this section. Act-type theorists typically refer to act types 
using expressions of the form, “the act type of ϕ-ing x1, …, xn”. I, too, will use this schematic 
form to generalize over such instances as “kissing John”, “giving a to b”, “attaching a onto 
b”, etc., and of course the act-type theorist’s “predicating a of b” and “saturating a with b” 
(here and below, I leave out the apposition, “the act type of”). 
Expressions of the form “ϕ-ing x1, …, xn” I call “structural, canonical act-type 
designators”, or SCADs. SCADs are like “that”-clauses in that they have their references 
independently of any empirical facts, except the facts about what their constituent 
expressions mean (hence, “canonical”). “That”-clauses are like this, too, and thus differ from 
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such “accidental”, non-canonical proposition-designators as “what he said”, which do so 
depend. Act types, too, can be referred to thus “accidentally”: compare “killing Caesar” with 
“the act type Brutus is best known for (having performed a token of)”. 
SCADs are important for act-type theorists, partly because they are canonical in the sense 
above, but more so because they contain designators of propositional constituents, as 
witnessed by “the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates”, containing “wisdom” and 
“Socrates” (and similarly for Fregean act-type theories). SCADs thereby enable 
straightforward formulations of compositional semantic axioms, where the semantic 
correlates of names and predicates are referred to by terms contained in the designators of the 
semantic correlates of sentences. 
The most important principle about act types for the argument to come is, 
 
(A1)  If ϕ-ing x1, …, xn = ϕ-ing y1, …, yn, then  
at least one of x1, …, xn is identical to one of y1, …, yn.2 
 
To give an intuitive feel for (A1), suppose we have four distinct bricks, a, b, c, and d. Surely, 
an act type directed toward a and b, e.g., the act type of laying a on b, cannot be identical 
with the same basic act type directed toward c and d, i.e., laying c on d. Contrapositively, if 
laying a on b = laying c on d, then at least one of a and b must be identical to either c or d. 
 If (A1) is true, then predicating the property of loving John of Mary must be distinct from 
predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John, since the four objects involved here 
																																																								
2 I think there are equally plausible but considerably stronger variants here, like the claim 
which is like (A1) but whose consequent reads, “x1 = y1 & … & xn = yn”. But (A1) is strong 
enough for my purposes. 
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are distinct. (A1) thereby plays an important part of the argument for the claim that act-type 
theorists are committed to taking “Mary loves John” to be ambiguous, i.e., to express more 
than one proposition. As I explain in more detail in §3, however, one might try to avoid the 
ambiguity claim by positing two distinct act types, say, predicating and predicating*. If so, 
then (A1) cannot be used to infer the ambiguity claim, since (A1) contains two occurrences 
of the same schematic letter, “ϕ”. But one might think there is an equally plausible principle 
threatening this alternative version of the act-type theory: 
 
 (A*)  If ϕ-ing x1, …, xn = ψ-ing y1, …, yn, then  
at least one of x1, …, xn is identical to one of y1, …, yn. 
 
With (A*), we can infer the ambiguity claim, since we here have two distinct schematic 
letters, “ϕ” and “ψ”. However, (A*) is inconsistent with the plausible claim, 
 
(ID) For every act type a, a = the act type of performing a. 
 
plus the trivial assumption that, e.g., kissing John ≠ John. Another counter-example to (A*) is 
the following: say that x johnates y just in case x introduces John to y, and that x maryizes y 
just in case x introduces y to Mary. Now, plausibly, johnating Mary = maryizing John, even 
though John ≠ Mary.  
Note, though, that both of these examples involve act types that somehow “overlap”. Now, 
it is rather plausible to think that the only counter-examples to (A*) involve precisely such 
overlapping act types. We could thus qualify (A*) by requiring the act types not to overlap, 
and this will give us a principle that can be used in the argument against the pluralist version 
of the act-type theory: 
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(A2) If (i) ϕ-ing x1, …, xn = ψ-ing y1, …, yn and (ii) ϕ-ing and ψ-ing do not overlap, 
then: one of x1, …, xn is identical to one of y1, …, yn. 
 
The notion of overlapping requires some explanation. Firstly, let’s say that act types involve 
other act types and objects, where this notion is governed by the schema: 
 
(IS) The act type of ϕ-ing x1, … xn involves ϕ-ing, as well as each of x1, … xn. 
 
Of course, we cannot read off from (IS) plus the identity claim “johnating Mary = maryizing 
John” that johnating and maryizing overlap. But with the definitions of johnating and 
maryizing, we can, and this is sufficient for our purposes.  
I will not be more specific about what involvement amounts to (e.g., by giving necessary 
and sufficient conditions for something’s being involved in an act type). I take (IS) to be 
undeniable, since it merely a stipulation, and I note that it does not force upon us any 
particular view about the nature of involvement. In particular, it does not require that we see 
involvement as somehow mereological in character.  
It would now be natural to propose that for act types to overlap is for there to be 
something they both involve. But given (ID), performing is involved in every act type. Hence, 
every act type overlaps with every other act type in this sense of “overlap”. I will therefore 
say instead that two act types overlap just in case they involve something not involved in 
every act type. Then, if two act types fail to overlap, they are as disjoint as act types possibly 
can be. Now, the special case of johnating and maryizing comes out as a case of overlapping 
in this sense, but other examples will be far between. 
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To assess the plausibility of (A2), keeping this sense of “overlap” in mind, consider its 
contrapositive, the claim that if ϕ-ing and ψ-ing do not overlap, then ϕ-ing x1, …, xn cannot 
be the same as ψ-ing y1, …, yn,. Suppose that ϕ-ing and ψ-ing do not overlap. Then, they are 
as disjoint as act types can be, like, say, kicking and conceiving-of. Then, surely, ϕ-ing x1, 
…, xn cannot be the same as ψ-ing y1, …, yn. And this will be so independently of whether or 
one (or each) of x1, …, xn is identical with one of y1, …, yn. 
(A2) entails that if “Mary loves John” is not ambiguous, predicating and predicating* 
overlap. Thus, to avoid the ambiguity claim, adherents of this view must take predicating and 
predicating* to overlap. In §3, I argue that this is a dubious claim. 
 I said that (A1) is obvious, but some readers might not be convinced. I will here point to 
some possible misinterpretations of (A1) on which it will seems unobvious or even false 
(much of this discussion will apply equally to (A2)). Firstly, it is natural to say that laying a 
on b is “the same kind of act” as laying c on d, even if a, b, c, and d are distinct. As an 
observation about our common, lay ways of dividing up act types, this is plausible enough. 
But, firstly, the finer division into object-related act types surely can be made. Also, act-type 
theorists clearly need to make it, on pain of saying that all atomic sentences express the same 
proposition (on a Russellian variant, this would be the mere act type of predicating). 
Doubts about (A1) might also be due to conflating 
 
(i) identity with being tokens of the same type, 
(ii) act types with act tokens, 
(iii) act types with their results. 
 
That these are indeed erroneous conflations will be obvious, but we do well to make them 
explicit, to ward off any possible confusion about (A1).  
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Firstly, some readers might take (A1)-(A2) to be unobvious because they read “=” as 
expressing the relation that holds between two things just in case they belong to the same 
type. Of course, it is unclear what “the type” is supposed to be here, but I am merely trying to 
identify a possible misreading on which the relevant identities may seem unobvious.  
Secondly, some believe that a token of one act type can be identical with a token of a 
distinct act type. On this view, if I insult John by insulting his mother, then my insulting John 
will be identical with my insulting his mother. But the relevant act types clearly cannot be 
identical. This example would be a counter-example to (A1) if the SCADs are interpreted as 
referring to act tokens (such a reading is helped by adding an implicit variable with a 
possessive “s”, as in, “x’s ϕ-ing …”). 
Thirdly, we might easily slip into reading “saturating x with y”, etc., as referring to the 
result of saturating x with y. When speaking of “saturating a predicate with a name”, for 
instance, we tend to focus at the results rather than at the act types of doing so (where the 
results in question are of course linguistic expressions). On such a “result reading” of the 
SCADs in (A1), it is false, as shown by the following example.  
Suppose we have three pieces of Lego, G, Y, and B (for green, yellow, and blue) and 
suppose that x^y is the result (not the act type) of attaching x on top of y. Here, x^y is a 
physical object consisting of x and y. Now, it should be clear upon reflection that (G^Y)^B = 
G^(Y^B). But since G^Y ≠ B ≠ G ≠ Y^B, (A1) is false under the relevant interpretation (I use 
“a ≠ b ≠ …” to say that all of a, b, … are distinct from one another). However, the act type 
(as opposed to the result) of attaching G^Y on top of B is not identical with the act type of 
attaching G on top of Y^B. One can clearly perform a token of one without performing a 
token of the other. So (A1) stands. 
I think this example can also be used to respond to another objection against (A1). To wit, 
one might object that (A1) seems plausible only so long as we focus on examples with wholly 
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disjoint objects, whereas when we consider overlapping objects, things are less clear. Thus, 
predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John could be identical with predicating 
the property of loving John of Mary, after all, since these properties overlap (they both 
involve loving). We can respond to this objection simply by pointing to the Lego example: 
G^Y and Y^B clearly overlap but the relevant act types (as opposed to results) are still 
distinct, contrary to the objection. 
 
3. The argument 
We are now in a position to present in full detail the argument involving “Mary loves John”. 
It will proceed as a dilemma, both horns of which turn out to lead to unattractive 
commitments. But let us begin by making some general observations about what an act-type-
theoretic semantics must be like. Like any semantics, it will need some semantic axiom(s) 
showing how the semantic correlate of a complex predicate is determined by those of its 
immediate parts. The simplest and most uniform semantics will operate with some axiom 
like,  
 
(PA) PLUGi(“F(ξ1, …, ξn)”, “a”) expresses plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]), 
 
where PLUGi is a mode of combination, taking an n-place predicate “F(ξ1, …, ξn)” and a 
name “a” to the n-1-place predicate resulting from saturating (or “plugging”) “F(ξ1, …, ξn)” 
in its ith place with “a”. Thus, PLUG2 takes “ξ loves ζ” and “John” to “ξ loves John”, and so 
on. 
Further, plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]) is the semantic correlate of PLUGi(“F(ξ1, …, ξn)”, “a”), 
and its nature will of course depend on whether we adopt a Russellian or Fregean conception 
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of propositions (this “plug notation” is taken from Zalta (1988), although his account of 
structured propositions is not an act-type theory). 
While (PA) is natural, it is not mandatory, so we should not base the argument on the 
assumption that act-type theorists are committed to it. And it suffices for the argument that 
we suppose only that they are committed to the weaker,  
 
(P1) For any monadic predicate “F(ξ)” and name “a”, PLUG1(“F(ξ)”, “a”) expresses 
plug1([F(ξ)], [a]), 
 
We are here presupposing that “Mary loves John” = PLUG1(“Mary loves ξ”, “John”), and so 
on, but this falls directly out of the definition of PLUG1 in terms of “saturate”.  
The claim that “Mary loves John” has alternative analyses can now be formalized as,  
 
(P2) “Mary loves John” = PLUG1(“Mary loves ξ”, “John”) = PLUG1(“ξ loves John”, 
“Mary”). 
 
Now, it follows from (P1) and (P2) that: 
 
 (C) (a) “Mary loves John” expresses plug1([Mary loves ξ], [John]), 
   (b) “Mary loves John” expresses plug1([ξ loves John], [Mary]). 
 
Further, where x is the semantic correlate of a monadic predicate, any act type theorists must 
take plug1(x, y), to be an act type directed toward x and y. Assuming they are committed to 
this claim, it is tempting to infer (given (P1) and (P2)) that they are also committed to holding 
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that, for some act type A and for any predicate “F(ξ)”, PLUG1(“F(ξ)”,“a”) expresses A-ing 
[F(ξ)],[a]. This would be fallacious, however. What follows is merely that for all predicates 
“F(ξ)”, there is an act type A such that PLUG1(“F(ξ)”,“a”) expresses A-ing [F(ξ)],[a]. 
A counter-example to the inference is a case where there are two distinct act types, A-ing 
and A*-ing, such that “Mary loves John” expresses the act type of A-ing [ξ loves John], 
[Mary] and the act type of A*-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John]. Although no act type theorist has 
opted for such a “pluralist” semantics, we do well to show that it, too, has undesirable 
consequences, since it may otherwise be seen as a possible retreat position for the act-type 
theorist in view of my argument. This is why the argument will proceed as a dilemma.  
Grabbing now the first horn, assume first that the act type theorist posits only one basic act 
type, which we call A-ing. He will then define plug1 so that, where x is a monadic predicative 
propositional constituent, 
 
 plug1(x, y) = the act type of performing A toward x and y (in that order), 
 
or, for short, 
 
 plug1(x, y) = A-ing x, y. 
 
Given these assumptions, (C) above entails 
 
(C2) (a) “Mary loves John” expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 
(b) “Mary loves John” expresses A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. 
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The unacceptable conclusion that “Mary loves John” is ambiguous follows from (C2) and the 
claim, 
 
 (≠) A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] ≠ A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary], 
 
which in turn follows from (A1) plus the trivial assumption that [Mary] ≠ [ξ loves John] ≠ 
[John] ≠ [Mary loves ξ].  
Showing how this argument afflicts the specific views of flesh-and-blood act-type 
theorists like Soames and Hanks is merely a trivial exercise of suitably instantiating the 
schematic argument given above. For instance, the instantiation of (≠) relative to Soames’s 
theory would just be 
 
(≠I) The act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John ≠  
the act type of predicating the property of loving John of Mary.  
 
Also, there is nothing further that these theorists have said that somehow helps them avoid 
the argument, since its premises are non-negotiable, not just commitments of this or that 
theorist (such considerations would just be ad hominem in any case). For instance, Soames’s 
identification of acts of predication with acts of entertaining plays no role in this argument 
(and similarly for Hanks’s view that predications are judgings). 
Consider now the second horn of the dilemma, which concerns pluralism. On this view, 
different basic act types must be appealed to depending on whether the predicate is of the 
form “R(ξ, a)” or “R(a, ξ)”). Rather than (C2), pluralism is committed to, 
 
(C2*) (a) “Mary loves John” expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 
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(b) “Mary loves John” expresses A*-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. 
 
By (A2) plus trivial distinctness claims, we can now infer that “Mary loves John” is 
unambiguous only if A-ing and A*-ing overlap. Let us now discuss this commitment. 
These act types would overlap, of course, if they were identical, and this is a fully 
intelligible hypothesis. But this just brings us back to the first horn of the dilemma. Thus, we 
must rather consider the hypothesis that they overlap but are distinct. But it is difficult to see 
just which object or basic act type these act types are supposed to have in common. Given 
this uncertainty, positing two distinct act types and insisting that they overlap also seems 
blatantly ad hoc: we are positing two highly unobvious claims only to avoid the conclusion 
that “Mary loves John” is ambiguous (the two claims being, firstly, that there are two basic 
act types, A-ing and A*-ing, and, secondly, that they overlap). To dodge this suspicion, some 
independent argument for this view is needed, but it is hard to see what such support might 
consist in. If, surprisingly, this way out should turn out viable, it would be a significant 
addition to standard act-type theories, and thus a significant result in any case. 
We have found that on both horns of the dilemma, the act-type theorist is hard pressed to 
avoid committed to the ambiguity of every sentence containing a polyadic predicate. Could 
they bite the bullet and accept the ambiguity? Note first that such a view would go beyond 
the familiar view that syntactically ambiguous sentences are semantically ambiguous. For the 
phenomenon of alternative analyses is not the same as syntactic ambiguity, as ordinarily 
conceived. A standard example of the latter is, “Flying planes can be dangerous”. This 
sentence is clearly ambiguous, saying, on one parsing, that the activity of flying planes can be 
dangerous, and, on the other, that planes that fly can be dangerous. But “Mary loves John” is 
quite different. A fortiori, it does not seem to have different truth-conditions, or to “say” 
different things depending on the “parsing”. Biting this bullet thus means hypostatizing an 
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ambiguity where there does not seem to be one, contrary to standard methodological 
principles of linguistic theory, and doing so only to avoid an objection against the act-type 
theory. Note also that not only will the act-type theorist be burdened with double ambiguity 
for sentences with dyadic predicates; the ambiguity of sentences will also increase with their 
complexity, with at least one new reading for each name-occurrence in a sentence. This is not 
a semantics anyone can bear. 
Biting this bullet would also raise many new, awkward questions. It is natural to assume 
that the proposition expressed by a sentence is something that can be believed, inferred, 
doubted, and so on, and this assumption is also made by act-type theorists. But which of the 
two propositions expressed by “Mary loves John” do we believe when, as one would naïvely 
put it, we “believe that Mary loves John”? Both? Could one believe one but not the other? If 
one can, then what does the difference consist in? And if one cannot, then the claim that they 
are nevertheless distinct violates even the fine-grained “cognitive significance” test of 
propositional identity urged by Frege.  
 
4. A further argument against pluralistic act-type theories 
Even if standard act-type theories are conclusively refuted by this argument, the “pluralist” 
variant, found on the second horn of the dilemma clearly isn’t. But there is a further argument 
against pluralists, to the effect that they must posit infinitely many basic act types directed 
toward the semantic correlates of monadic predicates and names.  
To see that they are so committed, consider the sentence “7 + 8 = 15”, which contains the 
complex triadic predicate, “ξ + ζ = χ”, as well as the monadic predicates, 
 
 “7 + 8 = ξ”, 
 “7 + ξ = 15”, 
Acts and Alternative Analyses	
20 	
 “ξ + 8 = 15”. 
 
If we try to avoid the conclusion that “7 + 8 = 15” is ambiguous by multiplying basic act 
types, we need to posit not two, but three distinct basic act types. By reasoning exactly 
paralleling the above, we would then be committed to,  
 
 (C2+)  (a) “7 + 8 = 15” expresses A-ing [7 + 8 = ξ], [15] 
    (b) “7 + 8 = 15” expresses A*-ing [7 + ξ = 15], [8] 
    (c) “7 + 8 = 15” expresses A**-ing [ξ + 8 = 15], [7], 
 
where A-ing  ≠ A*-ing  ≠ A**-ing. For if we suppose that it is not true that A-ing  ≠ A*-ing  ≠ 
A**-ing, then some identity between two of them holds and then the argument from (A1) sets 
in immediately and we can infer that “7 + 8 = 15” is ambiguous. We can generate infinitely 
many more arguments like this, with complex predicates of ever increasing adicities. 
Given this infinity of act types, certain claims that the act-type theorist will want to make 
cannot be finitely stated. Consider, for instance, the definition of plug1. It seems that this 
definition will need one clause for each of the infinitely many forms that monadic predicates 
may take, where these “forms” are,  
 
R(a1, …, an, ξ),  
R(a1, …, an-1, ξ, an),  
R(a1, …, an-2, ξ, an-1, an),  
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and so on, for all n. The simplest definition will define plug1 over predicative 
propositional constituents differing in which argument place (first, second, etc.) is 
“unsaturated”: 
 
 (DP)  plug1(x, y) =df the entity z such that if x is monadic, then: 
    if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and  
    if x is complex and has an empty slot in its first place, then z = A-ing x, y, and 
    if x is complex and has an empty slot in its second place, then z = A*-ing x, y, and  
     … 
 
Here, I use “empty slot” and “place” in a non-standard sense, in which, e.g., “1 = ξ” has an 
empty slot in its “second” place but not in its “first”. Normally, one would say that any 
monadic predicate has only one slot and that a slot is by definition empty. But I think this 
alternative terminology should be obvious enough. Now, since the adicities of predicates 
have no upper limit, this definition cannot be completed. As the first line of (DP) makes 
clear, it must have clauses for each adicity, but it is enough for our purposes to consider the 
first clause, dealing with monadic predicative propositional constituents. 
 As against this, it may be suggested that a finite formulation might still be available if, 
instead of merely labelling these act types “A”, “A*”, and so on, we refer to them using 
complex expressions containing numerals. For instance, we could posit a single, basic act 
type, C-ing, which takes as objects not merely the semantic correlates of predicates and 
names, but also positive integers. The definition of plug1 could then read, 
 
(DP′)  plug1(x, y) =df the entity z such that if x is monadic, then: 
    if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and  
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    if x is complex and has an empty slot in its nth place, then z = C-ing x, y, n 
    and if x is dyadic, … 
 
This solves the problem of the infinity of basic act types corresponding to different “empty 
slots”, in my special sense, and so allows us to formulate a finite clause for monadic 
predicative propositional constituents in the definition of plug1. However, this solution is 
purely formal, and sheds no light on how to make sense of C-ing and its relationship with the 
positive integers it is directed toward. So, although we should not reject this solution out of 
hand, we should note that it is so far only a schematic sketch, which needs to be filled in, and 
which goes far beyond standard act-type theories. 
 
5. A general constraint on structured propositions 
Doesn’t the argument above generalize to structured propositions in general, thus refuting the 
very idea? No, but it does amount to certain general constraints on theories of structured 
propositions. To wit, propositions may not be identified with the kind of structures that obey 
a principle analogous to (A1). Since not all structures do, however, the argument does not 
generalize to the very idea of structured propositions. This, in any case, will be the upshot of 
this section. 
The structures that do not obey any principle analogous to (A1) include mereological 
sums, states of affairs (referred to by sentence-nominalizations involving gerunds), and 
composite physical objects (referred to as the results of putting their parts together a certain 
way). For, where x⊓y is the mereological sum of x and y, (a⊓b)⊓c = a⊓(b⊓c) even when 
a⊓b ≠ c ≠ a ≠ b⊓c. Likewise, the state of affairs of John’s having the property of being loved 
by Mary is plausibly identical with the state of affairs of Mary’s having the property of 
loving John, even though John ≠ being loved by Mary ≠ Mary ≠ loving John. Finally, recall 
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that the composite pieces of Lego, G^(Y^B) and (G^Y)^B, are identical even though G ≠ 
Y^B ≠ G^Y ≠ B.  
We should get clearer on what it is for a kind of structure to “obey a principle analogous to 
(A1). To this end, we can generalize on (A1) to get the schema,  
 
(G) If X(x1, …, xn) = X(y1, …, yn), then at least one of x1, …, xn is identical with one 
of y1, …, yn, 
 
where “X” stands proxy for an expression, which, when saturated with n names (n ≥ 1), yields 
a singular term referring to some structure or other. Thus, “X(x1, …, xn)” may stand proxy for 
each of the following three: 
 
the mereological sum of x1, …, xn, 
 




(in the second and third examples, we ignore values of n other than 3 and 2, respectively).  
Now, the general constraint on theories of structured propositions cannot be simply, 
“propositions cannot be identified with structures satisfying (G)”. The constraint that can be 
derived from the argument of this paper is more specific, and it specifies how elements of the 
structure can be identified with certain types of propositional constituent only if the structure 
fails to satisfy (G), along the lines of, 
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(GC)  [F(a)] = X([F(ξ)], [a]) only if X does not satisfy (G1). 
 
For suppose X satisfies (G). We know that, on any reasonable semantics, there will be cases 
in which [R(ξ, b)] ≠ [a] ≠ [R(a, ξ)] ≠ [b]. From these assumptions, it follows that X(y, [R(a, 
ξ)], [b]) ≠ X(x, [R(ξ, b)], [a]), and, hence, that “R(a, b)” is ambiguous.  
For propositions to be identified with a type of structure, it is not enough that the latter 
fails to satisfy (G). For instance, although “the mereological sum of x1, …, xn” fails to satisfy 
(G), it satisfies the principle, “X(x1, x2, x3) = X(x1, x3, x2)”. Thus, identifying propositions with 
mere mereological sums would entail, absurdly, that [R(a, b)] = [R(b, a)]. 
Jeffrey King has proposed that propositions be identified with a certain kind of complex 
fact (2007). The simple atomic proposition that Rebecca swims is identified with the fact that 
Rebecca stands in a certain complex relation REL with the property of swimming. Now, for 
now-familiar reasons, King must say that the proposition that Mary loves John is identical 
both with (F1) the fact that Mary RELs [ξ loves John] and (F2) the fact that John RELs [Mary 
loves ξ]. (King himself accepts these commitments (2007: 16ff.).) The relevant instance of 
(G) is thus, 
 
(GK) If the fact that REL(x, y) = the fact that REL(z, w), then either x or y is identical 
with one of z and w. 
 
However, we cannot well have intuitions about the truth of (GK), and, although we will in the 
end find reason to reject (GK), we will do so by finding reason to believe that F1 ≠ F2. Since 
the latter is what we ultimately aim to discover, (GK) will play no role in our argument.  
Now, to see whether F1 = F2, we must first look closer at REL. King defines REL as 
holding between x and y iff  
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there is a language L, lexical items a and b of L and a context c, such that  
(i) a and b occur at the left and right terminal nodes (respectively) of the sentential 
relation R that in L encodes ascription &  
(ii)  x is the semantic value of a in c &  
(iii) y is the semantic value of b in c 
 
(King (2007: 62)). In contrast to the Lewisian, abstract conception of languages, King takes a 
language to be actually used (2007: 46f.). But in that case, there will be worlds in which F1 
but not F2 exists. For instance, there is a world where there is a language containing a 
primitive lexical element whose semantic value is [Mary loves ξ] but no language with a 
lexical element whose semantic value is [ξ loves John]. I am assuming here that there can be 
non-composite lexical elements that designate complex properties, but this seems innocuous. 
If such a world exists, however, then F1 ≠ F2, even on a very coarse-grained conception of 
facts, on which strict equivalence suffices for identity. 
 Suppose King switches to the Lewisian conception of languages. Then, however, the 
definiens of REL becomes a necessary truth for any values of “x” and “y”. Given the coarse-
grained conception of facts, there is then only one proposition! So the switch had better be 
coupled with a fine-grained conception of facts, on which F1 = F2 only if (1) they have the 
same structure and (2) for any entity e and node n in this structure, F1 has e at n just in case 
F2 has e at n. But on such a conception, clearly, F1 ≠ F2. It will not help if we express these 
facts by the more detailed formulation in the definiens of REL. That will merely show that the 
conjuncts within the scope of the existential quantifiers differ, whence, again, F1 ≠ F2. (This 
argument equally afflicts King’s actual account coupled with a fine-grained conception of 
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facts). I conclude that King’s theory, too, entails that sentences with alternative analyses are 
ambiguous, and is thus refuted.  
 
6. Some retreat positions 
By a “retreat position”, I mean a theory that is modified so as to avoid the argument above, 
but which is still in the spirit of standard act-type theories. I won’t define “being in the spirit 
of”, however, but one important way of assessing this matter is by seeing whether the 
position in question will have the advantages of standard act-type theories listed in the 
Introduction. I will consider three retreat positions, which say, respectively, that propositions 
are  
 
(i) equivalence classes of act types, 
(ii) results of act types, 
(iii) more inclusive act types (which can be performed by performing the usual act 
types of predicating, etc.).  
 
Option (i) is to define some relation of equivalence making A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and 
A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] equivalent, and then identify [Mary loves John] with some set 
containing both (and perhaps more). The main problem with this idea is that it does not take 
propositions to be (syntactically) structured, and so is not in the spirit of standard act-type 
theories.  
One might try to avoid the worst excesses of unstructured views of propositions by setting 
stricter conditions on equivalence. If equivalence is cashed out simply in terms of truth-in-
the-same-worlds or mutual inferability, then, for any p, q, [p] = [p & (q or not-q)], which is of 
course precisely the kind of consequence one wants to avoid by taking propositions to be 
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structured. But suppose we add the requirement that act types are equivalent only if the basic 
act type with “widest scope” in each is the same. Then, A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and A-
ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] come out as equivalent, and we can still distinguish [Mary loves 
John] from [Mary loves John and (p or not-p)] by saying that the latter proposition is the act 
type of A+-ing [and], [Mary loves John], [p or not-p], where A-ing ≠ A+-ing. 
But we can still not distinguish between [p and q] and [(p and q) and (r or not-r)]. 
Requiring in addition equivalent act types to have the same simple constituents would not be 
sufficient either, since [(Fa or not-Fa) and (Gb or not-Gb)] and [(Ga or not-Ga) and (Fb or 
not-Fb)] would still come out as identical. The obvious remedy is to say that act types a and b 
are equivalent just in case they have identical structures and, for any entity e and node n in 
this structure, a has e at n just in case b has e at n. However, this would make A-ing [ξ loves 
John], [Mary]) and A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] inequivalent, contrary to the initial 
assumption of this retreat position. This points to a general difficulty: that of distinguishing 
logically equivalent propositions without thereby multiplying propositions wherever there are 
alternative analyses. It is not clear whether any version of option (i) can meet this constraint, 
nor whether the resulting theory would be in the spirit of standard act-type theories. 
 Option (ii), on which propositions are results of act-types could perhaps be independently 
motivated (perhaps on the lines of Moltmann (2014), although she is no act-type theorist in 
our sense). But the idea as it stands is highly underspecified: we do not yet know what kind 
of entity propositions are, whether abstract, concrete, events, states, sets, etc. All we know is 
that they result from certain acts. 
There is also reason to think this account, however specified, will not be in the spirit of 
original act-type theories, because it will not assign any real theoretical work to act types. 
Assume that we decide that propositions are Xs, which result in some systematic way from 
act types of predicating or saturating. Suppose also we define plugi in the usual act-type-
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theoretical (Fregean or Russellian) way and then say that propositions are the values of some 
function plugi, such that plugi(x, y) always results in plugi(x, y). (Note that, for this account to 
avoid the argument of this paper, it must hold that plug1([ξ loves John], [Mary]) = 
plug1([Mary loves ξ], [John]).) The crux is that we can now just refer to propositions and 
propositional constituents using “plugi”, and any detour via mental acts will be otiose. The 
obvious alternative to (PA), for instance, would be, 
 
 (PA′)  PLUGi(“F(ξ1, …, ξn)”, “a”) expresses plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]). 
 
So, since act-types do not seem to do any useful theoretical work on option (ii), it is scarcely 
in the spirit of standard act-type theories. 
 Finally, let’s consider option (iii), of taking propositions to be “more inclusive” act types, 
such that the usual act types of predicating or saturating are mere ways of performing them. 
The idea is to say that [Mary loves John] is an act type that can be performed both by 
predicating/saturating [Mary loves ξ] of/with [John] and by predicating/saturating [ξ loves 
John] of/with [Mary], and similarly for the other examples. This seems to be in the spirit of 
the original act-type theory, since propositions are here identified with act-types, and also 
promises to allow for a workable compositional semantics.  
One might worry, though, that these act types cannot be referred to by SCADs. We have 
already seen how SCADs help state the axioms of an act-type-theoretic compositional 
semantics: with them, we can refer to the semantic correlate of a sentence with an expression, 
which contains singular terms referring to the semantic correlates of its immediate parts. 
However, even if propositions cannot be designated simply by SCADs, they could still be 
designated by expressions containing SCADs. If we had a clear, independently motivated 
conception of the inclusive act types with which we want to identify propositions, we should 
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be able to define a function f taking the usual, structural act types to the more inclusive act 
types. Then, we could say something of the form,  
 
[Mary loves John] = f(A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John]).  
 
(Given the argument of this paper, this entity must be identical with f(A-ing [ξ loves John], 
[Mary]). Thus, I don’t think the worry under consideration here is very serious.  
The problem, it seems to me, is rather that we currently only have a very inchoate, 
schematic sketch of this idea. We don’t know how to designate these more inclusive act 
types. We could try describing such an act type as the act such that a, b, c, … are ways of 
performing it. But how do we know if such descriptions single out unique act types? It is also 
unclear, on this kind of theory, toward which objects [Mary loves John] is supposed to be 
directed. Is [Mary loves ξ] among them, or [ξ loves John], or both? If these questions and 
problems could be handled somehow, perhaps the act-type theory could be resuscitated in the 
design of option (iii), but like many other potential escape routes we have been considering in 
this paper, this one lies far away from extant act-type theories. 
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